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WHY PECKING ORDER THEORY SHOULD BE INCLUDED 
IN INTRODUCTORY FINANCE COURSES 
  
THOMAS J. LIESZ 
MESA STATE COLLEGE 
  
  
ABSTRACT 
  
The majority of students majoring in various business administration emphases take 
only one finance course (Introductory Financial Management) while completing the 
requirements of their degrees.  A primary topic commonly covered in most 
introductory finance courses is capital structure, with a discussion that often 
culminates with a discussion of optimal capital structure.  Invariably the leading 
textbooks present optimal capital structure within the framework of the agency 
cost/tax shield trade-off model that evolved from Modigliani and Miller’s capital 
structure irrelevance hypothesis.  While this approach has solid grounding in value 
maximization arguments and capital market equilibrium theory, it nonetheless fails to 
explain several commonly observed - and reported - practices in modern corporate 
finance.  Pecking order theory offers an intriguing addition to the explanation of 
optimal capital structure, even in an introductory course.  However, few introductory 
textbooks give the theory much more than a cursory mention, if it is indeed mentioned 
at all.  The purpose of this paper is to make a case for including pecking order theory 
in any discussion of optimal capital structure. 
  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Studying capital structure is an important component of any typical introductory 
finance course.  The topic provides closure to a representative unit about capital 
budgeting and cost of capital as students discover the parameters faced by financial 
managers as they determine how best to finance capital projects that will hopefully 
enhance the value of their firms.  Such a unit also amplifies the importance of, and 
provides a stronger theoretical foundation for, financial analysis students are likely to 
encounter in subsequent courses such as Business Policy or Strategic 
Management.  The traditional approach found in most introductory textbooks is to 
present Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance hypothesis (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1958) and then build in the effects of taxes, financial distress, and agency 
costs until the “mainstream” model of optimal capital structure emerges.  It is a tidy 
approach (often referred to as the “Trade-Off Model”) that is easily understood under 
the basic underlying tenet of optimizing value - and thus shareholder wealth - by 
choosing a capital structure combination which elicits the lowest possible cost of 
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capital for the firm.  Once the firm finds this optimal combination of financing 
sources (that is, the mix of debt and equity sources that equates the benefits of the tax 
shield provided by debt with the increased costs of financial distress borne by the 
firm’s equity holders)  the assumption is that every new dollar of financing is raised in 
the same proportions of debt and equity financing.  However, this approach falls short 
in two different and important categories: reported and observed practice! 
  
II. REPORTED PRACTICE 
  
Two separate surveys examining capital structure decisions revealed very similar 
results.  In each survey financial executives were asked which of two major criteria 
determined their financing decisions: 1) maintaining a target capital structure or 2) 
following a hierarchy of financing.  Further, those who followed a hierarchy were 
asked to rank the order in which they would use various internal and external sources 
of funding.  The first survey (Pinegar & Wilbricht, 1989) was of Fortune 500 firms 
and the second (Hittle, Haddad & Gitman, 1992) was of the 500 largest Over-The-
Counter firms.  The results regarding which criterion was most often followed are 
shown in Table 1 below: 
  
Table 1.  Reported Use of Financing Decision Methodologies 
  
  
SURVEY 
AUTHORS 
  
RESPONDENT 
GROUP 
  
% 
USING        TARGET 
CAP STRUCTURE 
  
% USING 
HIERARCHY 
  
Pinegar & Wilbricht 
  
Fortune 500 Firms 
  
            31% 
  
            69% 
  
Hittle, et al. 
  
Large OTC Firms 
  
            11% 
  
            89% 
  
It is easy to see from the data in Table 1 that in real-world practice financial managers 
are much more likely to use a hierarchical approach than a target capital structure 
rationale when making financing decisions.  While this would seem to be inconsistent 
with value maximization arguments, this behavior is actually very rational given the 
motivations of managers and the vagaries of the U.S. capital markets. 
 
III. OBSERVED PRACTICE 
  
There are three observed real-world phenomena that are difficult to explain under the 
agency cost/tax shield trade-off model.  These include: 1) in many industries the most 
profitable firms often have the lowest debt ratios - which is the opposite of what the 
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trade-off model would predict  (Sunder & Myers, 1999); 2) large positive abnormal 
returns for a firm’s stockholders are associated more frequently with leverage-
increasing events (such as stock repurchases or debt-for-equity exchanges) than 
leverage-decreasing events (such as issuing stock) (Dann, 1981 and James, 1987); and 
3) few American companies issue new stock as frequently as once per decade. Taken 
together, these observed practices of American firms further support the notion that 
target capital structure is not the primary criterion used by financial managers when 
making financing decisions.   (Megginson, 1997) 
  
Thus, while the trade-off model is useful for explaining how financial 
managers can make financing decisions, it appears to have marginal explanatory value 
for how many financial managers actually do make these decisions in the real 
world.  With this in mind a case for introducing students to pecking order theory to 
complement trade-off theory can be made.  Table 2 below shows a sampling of how 
several popular financial management textbooks address the issue of optimal capital 
structure. 
  
Table 2.  Sampling of Textbook Approaches to Optimal Capital Structure Discussion 
  
  
            TEXTBOOK 
  
PRESENTS 
ONLY TRADE-
OFF 
  
PRESENTS 
BOTH MODELS 
  
Brigham, Gapenski & Ehrhardt 
  
            
  
            X 
  
Brigham & Houston 
  
            X 
  
  
  
Brealey & Myers 
  
  
  
            X 
  
Lasher 
  
            X 
  
  
  
Gitman 
  
  
  
            X 
  
Moyer, McGuigan & Kretlow 
  
  
  
            X 
  
Ross, Westerfield & Jordan 
  
            X 
  
  
  
Van Horne & Wachowicz 
  
            X 
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As Table 2 shows, many of the popular financial management and corporate finance 
textbooks do not present any competing theory to the traditional trade-off model.  Of 
the textbooks that do present both models the discussion of pecking order is often 
much briefer than that of the trade-off model.  Thus, many students never get exposed 
to any other model than the trade-off and are left with the incorrect impression that it 
is the only valid capital structure model in existence.  This could lead to incorrect 
assumptions regarding capital budgeting later on. 
  
IV. PECKING ORDER THEORY OVERVIEW 
  
Pecking order theory of capital structure states that firms have a preferred hierarchy 
for financing decisions.  The highest preference is to use internal financing (retained 
earnings and the effects of depreciation) before resorting to any form of external 
funds.  Internal funds incur no flotation costs and require no additional disclosure of 
proprietary financial information that could lead to more severe market discipline and 
a possible loss of competitive advantage.  If a firm must use external funds, the 
preference is to use the following order of financing sources: debt, convertible 
securities, preferred stock, and common stock.  (Myers, 1984)  This order reflects the 
motivations of the financial manager to retain control of the firm (since only common 
stock has a “voice” in management), reduce the agency costs of equity, and avoid the 
seemingly inevitable negative market reaction to an announcement of a new equity 
issue.  (Hawawini & Viallet, 1999)     
  
Implicit in pecking order theory are two key assumptions about financial 
managers.  The first of these is asymmetric information, or the likelihood that a firm’s 
managers know more about the company’s current earnings and future growth 
opportunities than do outside investors.  There is a strong desire to keep such 
information proprietary.  The use of internal funds precludes managers from having to 
make public disclosures about the company’s investment opportunities and potential 
profits to be realized from investing in them.  The second assumption is that managers 
will act in the best interests of the company’s existing shareholders.  The managers 
may even forgo a positive-NPV project if it would require the issue of new equity, 
since this would give much of the project’s value to new shareholders at the expense 
of the old.    (Myers & Majluf, 1984)    
  
          V. CAPITAL MARKET TREATMENT OF NEW SECURITY ISSUES 
  
The two assumptions noted above help to explain some of the observed behavior of 
financial managers.  More insight is gained by looking at how the capital markets treat 
the announcement of new security issues.  Announcements of new debt generally are 
treated as a positive signal that the issuing firm feels strongly about its ability to 
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service the debt into the future.  Announcements of new common stock are generally 
treated as a negative signal that the firm’s managers feel the company’s stock is 
overvalued (i.e. earnings are likely to decline in the future) and they wish to take 
advantage of a market opportunity.  So, it is easy to see why financial managers use 
new common stock as a last resort in capital structure decisions.  Just the 
announcement of a new stock issue will cause the price of the firm’s stock to fall as 
the market participants try to sort out the implications of the firm choosing to issue a 
new equity issue. 
  
VI. HOW PECKING ORDER IS SUPERIOR TO THE TRADE-OFF MODEL 
  
While the trade-off model implies a static approach to financing decisions based upon 
a target capital structure, pecking order theory allows for the dynamics of the firm to 
dictate an optimal capital structure for a given firm at any particular point in 
time.  (Copeland & Weston, 1988) A firm’s capital structure is a function of its 
internal cash flows and the amount of positive-NPV investment opportunities 
available.  A firm that has been very profitable in an industry with relatively slow 
growth (i.e. few investment opportunities) will have no incentive to issue debt and 
will likely have a low debt-to-equity ratio.  A less profitable firm in the same industry 
will likely have a high debt-to-equity ratio.  The more profitable a firm, the 
more financial slack it can build up. 
  
Financial slack is defined as a firm’s highly liquid assets (cash and marketable 
securities) plus any unused debt capacity.  (Moyer, McGuigan, and Kretlow, 
2001) Firms with sufficient financial slack will be able to fund most, if not all, of their 
investment opportunities internally and will not have to issue debt or equity 
securities.  Not having to issue new securities allows the firm to avoid both the 
flotation costs associated with external funding and the monitoring and market 
discipline that occurs when accessing capital markets. 
Prudent financial managers will attempt to maintain financial flexibility while 
ensuring the long-term survivability of their firms.  When profitable firms retain their 
earnings as equity and build up cash reserves, they create the financial slack that 
allows financial flexibility and, ultimately long-term survival. 
Pecking order theory explains these observed and reported managerial actions while 
the trade-off model cannot.  It also explains stock market reactions to leverage-
increasing and leverage-decreasing event, which the trade-off model cannot. 
  
VII. LIMITATIONS OF PECKING ORDER THEORY 
  
Pecking order theory, however, does not explain the influence of taxes, financial 
distress, security issuance costs, agency costs, or the set of investment opportunities 
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available to a firm upon that firm’s actual capital structure.  It also ignores the 
problems that can arise when a firm’s managers accumulate so much financial slack 
that they become immune to market discipline.  In such a case it would be possible for 
a firm’s management to preclude ever being penalized via a low security price and, if 
augmented with non-financial takeover defenses, immune to being removed in a 
hostile acquisition.  For these reasons pecking order theory is offered as a complement 
to, rather than a substitution for, the traditional trade-off model. 
  
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
  
While the traditional trade-off model is useful for explaining corporate debt levels, 
pecking order theory is superior for explaining capital structure changes.   By 
including a discussion of pecking order theory in the capital structure unit students 
will be exposed to a broad base of both theory and practice that will enable them to 
better understand how important financing decisions are made.  In addition to the 
traditional discussion of the impact of taxes, financial distress, and agency costs upon 
capital structure decisions, students will gain insight to how management motivations 
and market perceptions also impact these decisions.  Students will readily appreciate 
the concern managers have regarding the reporting requirements required to access 
capital markets.  They will also be able to explain why observed practice does not 
seem to always follow theory. 
Furthermore, the addition of pecking order theory into the basic discussion of capital 
structure provides one more opportunity for critical thinking to occur.  For example, 
the instructor can show how the debt ratios of leading companies in particular 
industries differ from the so-called industry averages to which most companies are 
usually compared during a cross-sectional financial analysis.  Thus, a given ratio 
(such as a debt ratio only half the industry average) might be argued as a “good” thing 
(since the firm has a large supply of financial slack and financial flexibility) rather 
than as a point of concern (the firm has opportunity costs due to not making efficient 
use of debt).  Students will have to critically evaluate that particular condition to judge 
which conclusion is correct. 
  
To summarize, by studying pecking order theory in conjunction with trade-off theory 
students will have a more rounded exposure to optimal capital structure.  This will 
prepare them well for not only future courses in which they will apply this knowledge, 
but also for their careers in the “real world” of business.  Table 3 summarizes the 
important differences between the two theories. 
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Table 3.  Comparison of Trade-off and Pecking Order Theory Traits. 
  
  
            TRADE-OFF THEORY 
  
            PECKING ORDER THEORY 
  
Conforms with value maximizing 
construct 
  
Considers managerial motivations 
  
Assumes a relatively static capital 
structure 
  
Allows for a dynamic capital structure 
  
Considers the influence of taxes, 
transaction costs, and financial distress 
  
Considers the influence of financial slack 
and availability of positive-NPV projects 
  
Ignores the impact of capital market 
“signals” 
  
Acknowledges capital market “signals” 
  
Ignores concerns regarding proprietary 
data 
  
Acknowledges proprietary data concerns 
  
Cannot explain many real-world practices 
  
Explains many real-world practices 
  
As Table 3 indicates, by including a combination of both the trade-off and pecking 
order theories, students will receive a more rounded view of capital structure theory 
and practice.  This view will better serve them both as they work their way through 
the upper-division coursework in business and as they begin their professional 
careers.  
Accordingly, authors of textbooks aimed at the introductory finance course are 
encouraged to give adequate exposure to pecking order theory as well as the 
traditional trade-off approach.  And instructors of introductory finance courses are 
urged to include pecking order in any discussion of capital structure theory.  To do 
any less presents an unrealistic view of this important topic. 
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